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An Ancient Bankruptcy Solution Makes
Economic Sense
Anh H. Ly, Michael Zakharevich, Olga Kosheleva, and Vladik Kreinovich

Abstract While econometrics is a reasonable recent discipline, quantitative solutions to economic problem have been proposed since the ancient times. In particular, solutions have been proposed for the bankruptcy problem: how to divide the
assets between the claimants? One of the challenges of analyzing ancient solutions
to economics problems is that these solutions are often presented not as a general
algorithm, but as a sequence of examples. When there are only a few such example,
it is often difficult to convincingly extract a general algorithm from them. This was
the case, for example, for the supposedly fairness-motivated Talmudic solution to
the bankruptcy problem: only in the mid 1980s, the Nobelist Robert Aumann succeeded in coming up with a convincing general algorithm explaining the original
examples. What remained not so clear in Aumann’s explanation is why namely this
algorithm best reflects the corresponding idea of fairness. In this paper, we find a
simple economic explanation for this algorithm.

1 The Bankruptcy Problem and Its Ancient Solution: An
Introduction
The bankruptcy problem: reminder. When a person or a company cannot pay
all its obligation, a bankruptcy is declared, and the available funds are distributed
Anh H. Ly
Banking University of Ho Chi Minh City, 56 Hoang Dieu 2, Quan Thu Duc, Thu Duc
Ho Ch Minh City, Vietnam
Michael Zakharevich
SeeCure Systems, Inc., 1040 Continentals Way # 12, Belmont, California 94002, USA
e-mail: michael@seecure360.com
Olga Kosheleva and Vladik Kreinovich
University of Texas at El Paso, 500 W. University,
El Paso, Texas 79968, USA, e-mail: olgak@utep.edu, vladik@utep.edu

1

2

Anh H. Ly, M. Zakharevich, O. Kosheleva, and V. Kreinovich

among the claimants. Since there is not enough money to give, to each claimant,
what he/she is owed, claimants will get less than what they are owed. How much
less? What is a fair way to divide the available funds between the claimants?
An ancient solution. The bankruptcy problem is known for many millennia, since
money became available and people starting lending money to each other. Solutions
to this problem have also been proposed for many millennia. One such ancient solution is described in the Talmud, an ancient commentary on the Jewish Bible [2].
Specifically, this solution is described in the Babylonian Talmud, in Ketubot 93a,
Bava Metzia 2a, and Yevamot 38a. (This solution is actually about a more general
problem of several contracts which cannot be all fully fulfilled.)
Like many ancient texts containing mathematics, the Talmud does not contain an
explicit algorithm. Instead, it contains four examples illustrating the main idea. In
the first three examples, the three parties are owed the following amounts:
• the first person is owed d1 = 100 monetary units,
• the second person is owed d2 = 200 monetary units, and
• the third person is owed d3 = 300 monetary units:
d1 = 100, d2 = 200, d3 = 300.
For three different available amounts E, the text describes the amounts e1 , e2 , and
e3 that each of the three person will get:

E
100
200
300

d1 = 100 d2 = 200 d3 = 300
e1
e2
e3
1
1
1
33
33
33
3
3
3
50
75
75
50
100
150

There is also a fourth example, formulated in a slightly different way – as the
question of dividing a disputed garment. In the bankruptcy terms, it can be described
as follows: the owed amounts are:
d1 = 50, d2 = 100.
The available amount E and the recommended division (e1 , e2 ) are as follows:

E
100

d1 = 50 d2 = 100
e1
e2
25
75

Example are here, but what is a general solution? There has been, historically, a
big problem with this solution: in contract to many other ancient mathematical texts,
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where the general algorithm is very clear from the examples, in this particular case,
the general algorithm was unknown until 1985. Actually, many researchers came
up with algorithms that explained some of these examples – while claiming that the
original ancient text must have contained some mistakes.
Mystery solved, algorithm is reconstructed. This problem intrigued Robert Aumann, later the Nobel Prize winner in Economics (2005). In his 1985 paper [1],
Professor Aumann came up with a reasonable general algorithm that explains the
ancient solution; see also [4, 8].
To explain this algorithm, we need to first start with the the case of two claimants.
Without losing generality, let us assume that the first claimant has a smaller claim
d1 ≤ d2 .
Then, if the overall amount E is small – to be precise, smaller that d1 – then this
amount E is distributed equally between the claimants, so that each gets
e1 = e2 =

E
.
2

When the available amount E is between d1 and d2 , i.e., when d1 ≤ E ≤ d2 , then
d1
the first claimant receives e1 = , and the second claimant receives the remaining
2
amount e2 = E − e1 .
This policy continues until we reach the amount E = d2 , at which moment the
d1
first claimant receives the amount d1 =
and the second claimant received the
2
d1
amount e2 = d2 − . At this moment, after receiving the money, both claimants
2
d1
lose the same amount of money: d1 − e1 = d2 − e2 = .
2
Finally, when the overall amount is larger than d2 (but smaller than the overall
amount of debt d1 +d2 ), the money is distributed in such a way that the losses remain
equal, i.e., that d1 − e1 = d2 − e2 and e1 + e2 = E. From these two conditions, we
can find the corresponding claims:
e1 =

E + d1 − d2
E − d1 + d2
, e2 =
.
2
2

The division between three (or more) claimants is then explained as the one for
which for every two claimants, the amounts given to them is distributed according to
the above algorithm. This can be easily checked if we select, for each pair (i, j) only
the overall amount Ei j = ei + e j allocated to claimants from this pair. As a result,
for the pairs (1, 2), (2, 3), and (1, 3), we get the following tables:
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E12
2
66
3
125
150

d1 = 100 d2 = 200
e1
e2
1
1
33
33
3
3
50
75
50
100

E23
2
66
3
150
250

d2 = 200 d3 = 300
e2
e3
1
1
33
33
3
3
75
75
100
150

d1 = 100 d3 = 300
e1
e3
2
1
100 66
33
3
3
125
50
75
200
50
150
E13

Remaining problem. That the ancient algorithm has been reconstructed, great. We
now know what the ancients proposed. However, based on the above description, it
is still not clear why this solution to the bankruptcy problem was proposed.
The above solution sounds rather arbitrary. To be more precise, both idea of dividing the amount equally and dividing the losses equally make sense, but how do
we combine these two ideas? And why in the region between E = min(d1 , d2 ) and
E = max(d1 , d2 ) the claimant with the smallest claim always gets half of his/her
claim while the second claimant gets more and more? How dow that fit with the
Talmud’s claim that the proposed division represents fairness?
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we propose an economics-based explanation for the above solution.

2 Analysis of the Problem
What is fair is not clear. At first glance, it may look like fairness means dividing
the amount either equally. If everyone is equal, why should someone gets more than
others?
However, this is not necessarily a fair division. Suppose that two folks start with
an equal amount of 400 dollars. They both decided to invest some money in the
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biomedical company that promised to use this money to develop a new drug curing
up-to-now un-curable disease. The first person invested $200, the second invested
$300. After this, the first person has $200 left and the second person has $100 left.
The company went bankrupt, and only $300 remains in its account. If we divide
this mount equally, both investors will get back the same amount of $150. As a
result:
• the first person will have $350 instead of the original $400, while
• the second person will have $250 instead of the original $400.
So, the first person loses only $50, while the second person loses three times more:
$150. So, the first person, who selfishly kept money to himself, gets more than the
altruistic second person who invested more in a noble case: how is this fair?
How we understand fairness: let us divide equally, but with respect to what
status quo point? If two people jointly find an amount of money, then fairness
means that this amount should be divided equally. If two people jointly contributed
to some expenses, fairness means that they should split the expenses equally.
In both cases, we have a natural status quo point (e
e1 , ee2 ):
• in the first case, we take (e
e1 , ee2 ) = (0, 0), and
• in the second case, we take (e
e1 , ee2 ) = (d1 , d2 ).
Any change from the status quo should be divided equally, i.e., we should have
e1 − ee1 = e2 − ee2 . So, to apply this idea to the bankruptcy problem, we need to
decide what is the status quo point here.
Comment. The idea that the difference between the actual amount and the status quo
point should be divided equally is not only natural and fair, it actually comes from
the game-theoretic notion of bargaining solution proposed by another Nobelist John
Nash; see, e.g., [6, 7].
What are possible ranges for the status quo point: example. Let us consider
one of the above cases, when the first person is owed d1 = 100 monetary units, the
second person is owed d2 = 200 units, and we have an amount E12 = 125 units to
distribute between these two claimants.
Depending on how we distribute this amount, the first person may get different
amounts. The best possible case for the first claimant is when he get all the money he
is owed, i.e., e1 = 100 monetary units. The worst possible case for the first claimant
is when all the money goes to the second person, and the first person gets nothing:
e1 = 0. Thus, the status quo point for the first person is somewhere in the interval
[e1 , e1 ] = [0, 100].
Similarly, the best possible case for the second person is when the second person
gets all the money, i.e., when e2 = 125. The worst possible case for the second
person is when the first claimant gets everything he is owed – i.e., all 100 units, and
the second person gets the remaining amount of e2 = 125 − 100 − 25 units. Thus,
the status quo point for the second person is somewhere in the interval
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[e2 , e2 ] = [25, 125].
Let us perform the same analysis in the general case.
What are possible ranges for the status quo point: general case. Without losing
generality, let us assume that the 1st person is the one who is owed less, i.e., that
d1 ≤ d1 . We will consider three different cases:
• when the available amount E12 does not exceed d1 : E12 ≤ d1 ;
• when the available amount E12 is between d1 and d2 : d1 ≤ E12 ≤ E2 , and
• when the available amount E12 exceeds d2 , i.e., d2 ≤ E12 ≤ d1 + d2 .
Let us consider these three cases one by one.
Case when the overall amount does not exceed the smallest claim. Let us first
consider the case when E12 ≤ d1 ≤ d2 . In this case, for the first person, the best
possible case is when this person gets all the amount E12 : e1 = E12 . The worst
possible case is when all the available money goes to the second claimant and the
first person gets nothing: e1 = 0. So, for the first person, the range of possible gains
is [e1 , e1 ] = [0, E12 ].
For the second person, the best possible case is when this person gets all the
amount E12 : e2 = E12 . The worst possible case is when all the available money goes
to the first claimant and the second person gets nothing: e2 = 0. So, for the second
person, the range of possible gains is [e2 , e2 ] = [0, E12 ].
Case when the overall amount is in the between the smaller and the larger
claims. Let us now consider the case when d1 ≤ E12 ≤ d2 . In this case, for the first
person, the best possible case is when this person gets all the amount it is owed:
e1 = d1 . The worst possible case is when all the available money goes to the second
claimant and the first person gets nothing: e1 = 0. So, for the first person, the range
of possible gains is [e1 , e1 ] = [0, d1 ].
For the second person, the best possible case is when this person gets all the
amount E12 : e2 = E12 . The worst possible case is when the first claimant gets all
the money he is owed (i.e., the amount d1 ), and the second person only gets the
remaining amount e2 = E12 − d1 . So, for the second person, the range of possible
gains is [e2 , e2 ] = [E12 − d1 , E12 ].
Case when the overall amount is larger than both claims. Let us now consider
the case when d1 ≤ d2 ≤ E12 . In this case, for the first person, the best possible case
is when this person gets all the amount it is owed: e1 = d1 . The worst possible case is
when the second person gets all the money it is owed, and the first person only gets
the remaining amount e1 = E12 − d2 . So, for the first person, the range of possible
gains is [e1 , e1 ] = [E12 − d2 , d1 ].
For the second person, the best possible case is when this person gets all the
amount it is owed: e2 = d2 . The worst possible case is when the first claimant gets
all the money he is owed (i.e., the amount d1 ), and the second person only gets the
remaining amount e2 = E12 − d1 . So, for the second person, the range of possible
gains is [e2 , e2 ] = [E12 − d1 , d2 ].

An Ancient Bankruptcy Solution Makes Economic Sense

7

Which points of the corresponding intervals should we select? In all three cases,
for both claimants, we have an interval of possible values of the resulting gain. On
each of these intervals, we need to select a status quo point that corresponds to the
equivalent cost of this interval uncertainty.
The problem of what is the fair cost e in the case of interval uncertainty [e, e] has
been handled by yet another Nobelist, Leo Hurwicz; see, e.g., [3, 5, 6]. Namely, he
proposed to select the value
ee = α · e + (1 − α ) · e,
where the coefficient α ∈ [0, 1] describes the decision-maker’s degree of optimismpessimism:
• the value α = 1 describes a perfect optimist, when the decision maker only takes
into account the most optimistic (best possible) scenario;
• the value α = 0 describes a complete pessimist, when the decision maker only
takes into account the worst possible scenario; and
• the values α strictly between 0 and 1 describe a realistic decision maker, who
takes into account both the best-case and the worst-case possibilities.
Let us see what will happen if we take one of these solutions as a status-quo point
and consider a division fair if the differences between the gains ei and the status quo
are equal: e1 − ee1 = e2 − ee2 .

3 No Matter What Our Level of Optimism, We Get Exactly the
Ancient Solution
Three cases: reminder. We will now show that in all the cases, we get exactly the
ancient solution – so we have a good economic explanation for this solution. To
show this, let us consider all three possible cases:
• case when E12 ≤ d1 ≤ d2 ,
• case when d1 ≤ E12 ≤ d2 , and
• case when d1 ≤ d2 ≤ E12 .
Case when the overall amount does not exceed the smallest claim: general formulas. In this case,
ee1 = α · e1 + (1 − α ) · e1 = α · E12 + (1 − α ) · 0 = α · E12
and similarly,
ee2 = α · e2 + (1 − α ) · e2 = α · E12 + (1 − α ) · 0 = α · E12 .
Thus, the fairness condition e1 − ee1 = e2 − ee2 takes the form e1 − α · E12 = e2 − α ·
E12 , i.e., the form e1 = e2 .
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So, in this case, no matter what is the optimism-pessimism value α , we divide
the available amount E12 equally between the claimants:
e1 = e2 =

E12
.
2

This is exactly what the ancient solution recommends in this case.
Case when the overall amount does not exceed the smallest claim: example. Let
2
us consider one of the above examples, when d1 = 100, d2 = 200, and E12 = 66 .
3
1
In this case, the above formulas recommend a solution in which e1 = e2 = 33 .
3
2
For the optimistic case α = 1, the status quo point is ee1 = e1 = 66 and ee2 =
3
2
e1 = 66 . Thus, the condition of fairness with respect to this optimistic status quo
3
1
point is indeed satisfied: e1 − ee1 = e2 − ee2 = −33 .
3
Case when the overall amount is in the between the smaller and the larger
claims: general formulas. In this case,
ee1 = α · e1 + (1 − α ) · e1 = α · d1 + (1 − α ) · 0 = α · d1
and
ee2 = α · e2 + (1 − α ) · e2 = α · E12 + (1 − α ) · (E12 − d1 ) = E12 − (1 − α ) · d1 .
Thus, the fairness condition e1 − ee1 = e2 − ee2 takes the form
e1 − α · d1 = e2 − E12 + (1 − α ) · d1 = e2 − E12 + d1 − α · d1 .
Canceling the common term −α · d1 on both sides, we get e1 = e2 − E12 + d1 . Substituting e2 = E − e1 into this formula, we conclude that e1 = E12 − e1 − E12 + d1 ,
i.e., e1 = −e1 + d1 . Moving the term −e1 to the left-hand side, we get 2e1 = d1 and
d1
d1
e1 = . The second person gets the remaining amount e2 = E12 − .
2
2
This is also exactly what the ancient solution recommends in this case.
Case when the overall amount is in the between the smaller and the larger
claims: example. Let us consider one of the above examples, when d1 = 100, d2 =
200, and E12 = 125. In this case, the above formulas recommend a solution in which
100
e1 =
= 50 and e2 = E12 − e1 = 125 − 50 = 75.
2
Here, the optimistic status quo point is ee1 = d1 = 100 and ee2 = E12 = 125. Thus,
the condition of fairness with respect to this optimistic status quo point is indeed
satisfied: e1 − ee1 = 50 − 100 = −50 and e2 − ee2 = 75 − 125 = −50.
Case when the overall amount is larger than both claims: general formulas. In
this case,
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ee1 = α · e1 + (1 − α ) · e1 = α · d1 + (1 − α ) · (E12 − d2 ) =

α · d1 + (1 − α ) · E12 − (1 − α ) · d2
and
ee2 = α · e2 + (1 − α ) · e2 = α · d2 + (1 − α ) · (E12 − d1 ) =

α · d2 + (1 − α ) · E12 − (1 − α ) · d1 .
Thus, the fairness condition e1 − ee1 = e2 − ee2 takes the form
e1 − α · d1 − (1 − α ) · E12 + (1 − α ) · d2 =
e2 − α · d2 − (1 − α ) · E12 + (1 − α ) · d1 .
Canceling the comon term −(1 − α ) · E12 in both sides, we get
e1 − α · d1 + (1 − α ) · d2 = e2 − α · d2 + (1 − α ) · d1 .
Moving terms containing d1 and d2 to the right-hand side, we conclude that e1 =
e2 + d1 − d2 . Substituting e2 = E12 − e1 into this formula, we get e1 = E12 − e1 +
d1 − e2 . Moving the term −e1 to the left-hand side, we get 2e1 = E12 + d1 − e2 and
E12 + d1 − d2
e1 =
. The second person gets the remaining amount
2
e2 = E12 −

E12 + d1 − d2
E12 − d1 + d2
=
.
2
2

This too is exactly what the ancient solution recommends in this case.
Case when the overall amount is larger than both claims: example. Let us consider one of the above examples, when d1 = 50, d2 = 100, and E12 = 100. In this
case, the above formulas recommend a solution in which
e1 =

100 + 50 − 100
100 − 50 + 100
= 25 and e2 =
= 75.
2
2

Here, the optimistic status quo point is ee1 = d1 = 50 and ee2 = d2 = 100. Thus,
the condition of fairness with respect to this optimistic status quo point is indeed
satisfied: e1 − ee1 = 25 − 50 = −25 and e2 − ee2 = 75 − 100 = −25.
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